Como consecuencia de la crisis económica, inmobiliaria y financiera experimentada en España en los últimos años, muchos deudores hipotecarios no pueden hacer frente a sus cuotas y corren el riesgo de perder sus viviendas, en ocasiones conservando una deuda imposible de afrontar. El sobrendeudamiento y la morosidad hipotecaria abocan así a ciertas economías domésticas a situaciones insostenibles que pueden llevar a una reordenación de los gastos y necesidades, entre los que las cuotas hipotecarias dejan de tener prioridad. La legitimación de (...) la condición de moroso que puede observarse en esos casos es un fenómeno con importantes implicaciones antropológicas, en la medida en que constituye un cuestionamiento de la obligación de devolver el préstamo. Desde el punto de vista de los deudores y de quienes les brindan apoyo, caer en el impago, lejos de constituir una transgresión moralmente reprobable, puede entenderse como un acto de responsabilidad que tiende al sostenimiento de la vida. (shrink)

Desde el estallido en 2008 de la burbuja inmobiliaria y financiera, el sobreendeudamiento hipotecario representa una preocupación para muchas familias españolas y catalanas, en un contexto de «nueva pobreza» caracterizada por el desempleo masivo y por unas políticas de austeridad que han conducido a muchas personas a la exclusión social. La pérdida de la vivienda tiene impacto sobre las relaciones sociales y condiciona tanto las estrategias socioeconómicas como las interpretaciones culturales del endeudamiento, en términos de estigma y de negación de (...) una segunda oportunidad vital. Las realidades analizadas en el contexto de esta emergencia habitacional están marcadas por la amenaza del sinhogarismo, pero también por la oportunidad de la participación en un movimiento colectivo. Desde una aproximación etnográfica, los textos exploran, por una parte, la condición del endeudamiento y su impacto en las personas, y, por otra, las funciones ideológicas, políticas y socio-afectivas de un movimiento social en desarrollo. (shrink)

The profound changes in personality, mood, and other features of the self that neural interventions can induce can be disconcerting to patients, their families, and caregivers. In the neuroethical debate, these concerns are often addressed in the context of possible threats to the narrative self. In this paper, I argue that it is necessary to consider a dimension of impacts on the narrative self which has so far been neglected: neural interventions can lead to a loss of meaning of actions, (...) feelings, beliefs, and other intentional elements of our self-narratives. To uphold the coherence of the self-narrative, the changes induced by neural interventions need to be accounted for through explanations in intentional or biochemical terms. However, only an explanation including intentional states delivers the content to directly ascribe personal meaning, i.e., subjective value to events. Neural interventions can deprive events of meaning because they may favor a predominantly biochemical account. A loss of meaning is not inherently negative but it can be problematic, particularly if events are affected one was not prepared or willing to have stripped of meaning. The paper further examines what it is about neural interventions that impacts meaning by analyzing different methods. To which degree the pull towards a biochemical view occurs depends on the characteristics of the neural intervention. By comparing Deep Brain Stimulation, Prozac, Ritalin, psychedelics, and psychotherapy, the paper identifies some main factors: the rate of change, the transparency of the causal chain, the involvement of the patient, and the presence of an acute phenomenological experience. (shrink)

An accessible yet rigorous introduction to the influential French philosopher Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation. Gilbert Simondon, one of the most influential contemporary French philosophers, published only three works: L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective, both drawn from his doctoral thesis, and Du mode d'existence des objets techniques. It is this last work that brought Simondon into the public eye; as a consequence, he has been considered a “thinker of technics” and cited often in pedagogical reports (...) on teaching technology. Yet Simondon was a philosopher whose ambitions lay in an in-depth renewal of ontology as a process of individuation—that is, how individuals come into being, persist, and transform. In this accessible yet rigorous introduction to Simondon's work, Muriel Combes helps to bridge the gap between Simondon's account of technics and his philosophy of individuation. Some thinkers have found inspiration in Simondon's philosophy of individuation, notably Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Combes's account, first published in French in 1999, is one of the only studies of Simondon to appear in English. Combes breaks new ground, exploring an ethics and politics adequate to Simondon's hypothesis of preindividual being, considering through the lens of transindividual philosophy what form a nonservile relation to technology might take today. Her book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand Simondon's work. (shrink)

The commentaries on the Ethica nova and the Ethica vetus written by some masters of the arts – presumably operating in the Paris faculty – in the first half of the thirteenth century expound in an original way the doctrine of the virtutes consuetudinales which Aristotle, at the end of the first book of his Ethica (I 13), distinguishes into the two main classes of the “moral virtues” and the “intellectual virtues”. The present paper aims at highlighting the particularly important (...) task which is assigned to the intellectual virtues in these early commentaries: joining man to God directly, through a contemplation which becomes love. The masters of the arts maintain that the moral virtues, in spite of the definition given by Aristotle (habitus a quo quis bonus est et opus eius bene reddit), are not sufficient alone to bring man to perfection, but that other more perfect virtues, namely the intellectual ones, are needed in order to make him know and love the supreme good. Having no knowledge of the sixth book of the Ethica, in which Aristotle deals in particular with the intellectual virtues, our masters know only their general description and are concerned with clarifying their relationships with the moral virtues, compared to which they appear to be sometimes really distinct and sometimes united to them in sharing the recta ratio, so much that they may constitute a double virtue. Although the masters of the arts seem to be well-informed about the teaching of the theologians – which they often cite without opposing to it, albeit stressing their own philosophical point of view –, it is significant that no reference whatsoever is made by them to the theological virtues and that they have recourse to the themes of Avicennian mysticism such as the doctrine of the two faces of the soul. Besides presenting the commentaries on the Ethica vetus from a general point of view, I will focus on the Paris commentary in Ethicam veterem (Paris BN lat. 3804A, ff. 152ra-159vb, 241ra-247vb; Paris BN lat. 3572, ff. 226ra-235ra), of which I am preparing a critical edition. The Paris commentary contains in fact a special and original discussion of the doctrine of the virtutes intellectuales. (shrink)

Written by two of the leading figures in the field, this is a lucid and systematic introduction to semantics as applied to transformational grammars of the ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Husserlian Phenomenology and the Treatment of DepressionCommentary and CritiqueMarilyn Nissim-Sabat (bio)KeywordsHusserl, phenomenology, psychotherapy, drug therapyProfessor Hadreas begins his interesting and challenging essay by saying that, "This paper is concerned with a model of self-awareness which fits the testimony of subjects' reactions to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac, Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the best known" (2010, 43). Several important features of Dr. Hadreas' approach can (...) be inferred from this statement. Most important, the verbatim testimony of subjects regarding their states of self-awareness is analyzed and interpreted for its compatibility with three philosophical models of self-awareness: Empiricism, rationalism, and Husserlian phenomenology. This is the methodology through which the author aims to show that one of the three models is more adequate than the others as a model of the self-awareness of the subjects, and that model is that of Husserlian phenomenology (hereinafter, phenomenology, with the understanding that only phenomenology according to Husserl is intended by both Dr. Hadreas and myself). In formulating this as the aim of his paper and his research, Dr. Hadreas has taken on an extremely difficult task.In general, attempts to show that any philosophical stance bears directly and immediately on the understanding of patients' symptoms, as well as on both theoretical and therapeutic work with people with mental disorders, is, owing to the ostensible gap in levels of conceptualization and systematicity, that is, the theory/praxis divide ostensibly separating the two realms, extraordinarily difficult. The task is rendered even more difficult in work like that of Prof. Hadreas,' in which, I believe, the researcher does not want to "apply" philosophy parasitically, as if research into psychiatric phenomena in relation to philosophy is just a matter of cannibalizing philosophy for self-justification, or vice versa; rather, Hadreas wants to preserve the integrity of both research into the phenomenology of psychiatric disorders and of [End Page 53] the philosophical perspective that may improve understanding of those disorders. In undertaking an effort along these lines, Hadreas breaks new ground.In particular, for this commentator, bringing Husserlian phenomenology to bear on these issues is particularly gratifying. Moreover, and most important, Hadreas bases his critique of classical empiricist and rationalist models of self-awareness on bringing to the fore Husserl's views on pre-reflective consciousness. This is extremely important for, as Dan Zahavi, noted Husserlian phenomenologist and philosopher of the phenomenology–psychiatry interface, points out, not only in the book cited by Hadreas but in a more recent article (Zahavi 2003), Husserl's notion of self-awareness has been critiqued by many who claim that he lacked a notion of pre-reflective consciousness. Indeed, Zahavi's (2003) work in this area quite effectively refutes these claims, and he does so by drawing on a large body of evidence from Husserl's posthumous writings. Thus, Hadreas is to be congratulated for using Husserl's long-neglected notion of pre-reflective consciousness as a means of approaching phenomenologically the testimony of patients who discussed changes in their self-awareness owing to their experiences with SSRI medications, chiefly fluoxetine. However, it is just because I share with Hadreas the conviction that Husserlian phenomenology is the best philosophical approach to understanding, and indeed, possibly improving the treatment of mental disorders, that I think it is vital to raise some questions regarding Hadreas' approach.My first critical comment is this: Hadreas' aim in writing his paper is unclear in a way that calls his project into question. In the conclusion of his paper, he indicates that his findings can enable psychiatrists to determine which patients are more likely to experience "SSRI cures." Given this, it would seem that his purpose in introducing Husserlian phenomenology is to facilitate this goal. Those subjects, he finds (based on his phenomenological analysis of the subjects' own testimony), who "have lived enough of life to have formed, for better or worse, an abiding empirical ego" are more likely to be "good responders" to SSRIs. It would seem, then, that this finding would aid psychiatrists in evaluating patients who have been treated, or who might be treated, with SSRIs. This, then, if correct, would be a considerable... (shrink)

“No lo hicieron extraterrestres; fueron personas como nosotros[1]” comentaban en el programa especial del InfoK[2] sobre el Holocausto. Kitson, Steward y Husbands lo justifican: una de las mayores dificultades del alumnado que aprende contenidos históricos es entender por qué las personas de un contexto hicieron lo que hicieron. Desde la enseñanza de la historia se ha reflexionado ampliamente sobre las causalidades relacionadas con ciertos hechos históricos, pero se ha dado menos peso a analizar las interpretaciones sobre la agencia histórica. En (...) este artículo nos proponemos repasar y concretar la conceptualización que desde la didáctica de las ciencias sociales se ha dado a la agencia histórica en la comprensión de las causalidades para entender las decisiones y las responsabilidades de las personas en contextos como el del Holocausto para entender que todas las personas somos agentes sociales, de cambio y continuidad y, por tanto, agentes históricas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mild Cognitive Impairment:What's in a Name?Steven R. Sabat (bio)Keywordslabeling, mild cognitive impairment, recall memory, selfhood, stereotype threatCorner and Bond (2006) raise a number of important conceptual issues related to the problems involved in defining mild cognitive impairment (MCI), differentiating it from normal aging, the definition of normal aging itself, and ethical issues surrounding the possible adverse effects of a diagnosis of MCI on the individuals thus described. It would (...) seem that portentous ramifications are involved and that clarifying the conceptual issues would be of great value, not only to researchers but also to the ever-growing population of elderly people. In what follows, I address some of these issues further.Problems of Definition and MeasurementOne of the problems that the authors discuss at the outset of their article concerns what methods are appropriate for detecting those with MCI: "Neuropsychological tests alone do not discriminate between normal aged-related memory loss and MCI or dementia and clinical judgment remains central to diagnosis" (Corner and Bond 2006, 5). Of course, to be able to discriminate between normal aged-related memory problems and MCI, we must first be able to define the former. What exactly is normal? As the authors correctly point out, the term has different meanings, one being normative (usual), another being nonpathologic. Is it normal (usual) for some sort of breakdown to occur in brain systems as a function of increased age? If so, is there a threshold age below which the very same physiologic breakdown is unusual? Would such a threshold age, if one existed, be the same for everyone, regardless of genotype and the cumulative interactive effects of nutrition, health, and stress-related factors over a period of decades? In effect, is some sort of memory impairment part of the natural (usual) process of aging for some people at particular ages rather than for others? And exactly what does it mean to be mildly impaired in the cognitive domain?Hogan and McKeith (2001) presented a working group's definition characterizing MCI such that people who complain about memory problems and who also provide objective evidence of such problems, yet who simultaneously display "normal general cognitive function and intact activities of daily living" (Hogan and McKeith 2001, 1131), should be identified and followed. Here again, however, we confront the problem of defining "normal general cognitive function" as well as "normal activities of daily living." Can one have normal general cognitive function without normal memory function? If so, what exactly constitutes [End Page 13] general cognitive function and on what conceptual or theoretical basis is such a definition valid? Furthermore, what sort of memory function are we talking about? Memory can be said to involve a number of stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval. Retrieval can be of the explicit type (conscious recall or recognition of specific information) with which people with Alzheimer's disease (AD) often reveal deficits or of the implicit type (a change in behavior as a result of previous experience of which the person may have no conscious recollection) as demonstrated in people with AD (Knopman and Nissen 1987). That is, people with AD can display deficits in explicit memory functions without similar deficits simultaneously in implicit memory functions.A partial answer to the question about memory loss in MCI may be found in the use of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, and McHugh 1975), originally intended to be used as a screening device, but employed more and more frequently as an outcome measure to assess cognitive decline as well as the efficacy of drug treatments. Although the examination purports to test orientation, registration, attention, calculation, recall, language (naming, repeating, reading, writing, three-stage command), and construction, a task analysis reveals that the test is not quite as "global" in the cognitive domain as it is purported to be. For example, ten of the maximum thirty points on the examination are earned for "orientation" in time and place. Yet, all of the questions in this section of the test require intact recall of the relevant information. For example, if a person is asked, "What day of the week is this?" and replies "I don't know," the... (shrink)

Le récit du siège et de la prise d'Amid, place-forte de Mésopotamie, en 502, constitue un exemple intéressant de la manière dont se transmet un récit historique de la tradition grecque au domaine syriaque et au-delà. Présent dans l'historiographie grecque (Évagre, Procope, Malalas, Théophane) comme un épisode de la brève période d'affrontement entre Perses et Romains dans les années 502–507, ce récit connaît un succès particulier dans les textes syriaques où il passe du domaine de l'histoire à celui de la (...) légende. Cet épisode apparaît dans l'Histoire d'Édesse de 506 du pseudo-Josué, dans l'Histoire ecclésiastique du pseudo-Zacharie et dans toutes les chronographies importantes: celle de Zuqnin, du pseudo-Denys, dans celle d'Édesse de 1234 et dans celle de Michel le Syrien. Il est par ailleurs mentionné dans toutes les petites chroniques, qui indiquent la date, la durée, le nombre de victimes du siège. La similitude entre la version de Procope et celle du pseudo-Zacharie a déjà été relevée mais n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une enquête qui permette d'élucider les liens qui les unissent et d'établir par quelle voie ce texte est passé du grec au syriaque où il a été retravaillé pour répondre à des besoins apologétiques. La chute de la ville aux mains des Perses est en effet présentée à partir de l'Histoire ecclésiastique du pseudo-Zacharie comme une punition pour les chrétiens infidèles, livrés au roi perse Kavadh à qui le Christ serait apparu et aurait donné la victoire. Le récit est dès lors utilisé pour exhorter les communautés chrétiennes à persévérer dans la foi « orthodoxe ». Cette version du siège est ensuite traduite de manière inattendue en arabe puis en géorgien, dans ce qui semble être le reste d'une chronique. (shrink)

Admirador da metafísica de Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner expressou em sua obra, de modo congenial ao filósofo, sua própria visão pessimista de mundo. O presente ensaio busca apontar - na obra O Anel dos Nibelungos - este parentesco e nele as diferenças essenciais que enlaçam de modo poderoso e fascinante os dois autores.

Marx the Humanist presents Marx’s writings in a different light. Instead of malicious demagnification, which makes him responsible for everything done in his name after his death, it is recognised that he was not a prophet and could not have foreseen the changes that have occurred since then. His early writings reflect his humanism, and represent his long-term revolutionary appeal. Although the focus is on Marx’s humanism, the first two parts initiate the reader and provide an introduction to basic Marxist (...) ideas, both philosophical and economic. This provides the context for his condemnation of the dehumanising impact of capitalism on workers through exploitation. (shrink)

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of (...) how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity. (shrink)

Since the late 1980’s Kim has presented some major reasons to abandon SC. In MIAPW at least four of these reasons are offered: under SC we lose mental causation, mental realism and psychological explanations. Moreover, supervenience cannot do the job as the cementing relation in SC.

The foundation of the Australian colonial project lies within an ‘originary violence’, in which the state retains a vested interest in maintaining the founding order of things. Inequalities and iniquities are maintained for the purpose of sustaining the life and continuity of the state. The Australian state, founder of a violent order is called upon by the international community to conform and uphold ‘human rights’, but what does this call to conformity require, particularly when the call comes from states which (...) are also founded upon colonial violence? This article argumes that very little is required beyond the masquerade that ‘equality’ for Aboriginal peoples is an on-going project of the state. So for what purpose does the masquerade continue? (shrink)

The foundation of the Australian colonial project lies within an ‘originary violence’, in which the state retains a vested interest in maintaining the founding order of things. Inequalities and iniquities are maintained for the purpose of sustaining the life and continuity of the state. The Australian state, founder of a violent order is called upon by the international community to conform and uphold ‘human rights’, but what does this call to conformity require, particularly when the call comes from states which (...) are also founded upon colonial violence? This article argumes that very little is required beyond the masquerade that ‘equality’ for Aboriginal peoples is an on-going project of the state. So for what purpose does the masquerade continue? (shrink)

This essay is a critical review of two recent collections, Feminism and Foucault: Reflections on Resistance, edited by Irene Diamond and Lee Quinby and Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell. While the collections differ in their manner of addressing the critical sources that have inspired them-the former relying upon a single theorist, the latter attempting to move through some of the philosophical history that constitutes our present theoretical terrain-both attempt to (...) think through and thus revisualize some of the categories of difference which we have inherited. Though the best essays from these collections are celebrated for demonstrating how "feminism as critique" can work to move us toward a clearer and more inclusive feminist theory, questions are raised about what the inattention to race in these volumes suggests about our own role in the construction of power and knowledge, and the erasures that help to secure them both. (shrink)

Novel technological devices, applications, and algorithms can provide us with a vast amount of personal information about ourselves. Given that we have ethical and practical reasons to pursue self-knowledge, should we use technology to increase our self-knowledge? And which ethical issues arise from the pursuit of technologically sourced self-knowledge? In this paper, I explore these questions in relation to bioinformation technologies (health and activity trackers, DTC genetic testing, and DTC neurotechnologies) and algorithmic profiling used for recommender systems, targeted advertising, and (...) technologically supported decision-making. First, I distinguish between impersonal, critical, and relational self-knowledge. Relational self-knowledge is a so far neglected dimension of self-knowledge which is introduced in this paper. Next, I investigate the contribution of these technologies to the three types of self-knowledge and uncover the connected ethical concerns. Technology can provide a lot of impersonal self-knowledge, but we should focus on the quality of the information which tends to be particularly insufficient for marginalized groups. In terms of critical self-knowledge, the nature of technologically sourced personal information typically impedes critical engagement. The value of relational self-knowledge speaks in favour of transparency of information technology, notably for algorithms that are involved in decision-making about individuals. Moreover, bioinformation technologies and digital profiling shape the concepts and norms that define us. We should ensure they not only serve commercial interests but our identity and self-knowledge interests. (shrink)

Dans le cadre de la collecte des corpus oraux et multimodaux en Sciences Humaines et Sociales (SHS), le respect de l’application du nouveau Règlement Général sur la Protection des Données à caractère personnel provoque un profond bouleversement dans l’organisation et les méthodes de travail des chercheurs. C’est aussi le cas de la Loi Jardé, relative aux recherches impliquant la personne humaine, qui a étendu la notion de protection des personnes au-delà du champ de la recherche biomédicale. Ces deux importants changements (...) de cadre législatif obligent aujourd’hui la communauté scientifique à s’interroger à la fois sur la protection de la personne et sur la protection des données à caractère personnel.En définitive, avant d’initier un travail de recherche, un important travail de réflexion et d’actions est à mettre en place pour collecter des données dans le respect de la réglementation de protection des données et du cadre législatif de protection de la personne humaine. Identifier les difficultés pour envisager les solutions les plus adaptées est la mission que s’est fixée le groupe de réflexion constitué autour de la question « éthique » au Laboratoire Parole et Langage (LPL 2020). Nous proposerons dans cet article les réflexions argumentées de notre groupe sur l’impact de ces nouvelles réglementations sur les recherches en linguistique. (shrink)

This paper presents a functional genealogy of essentialist authenticity. The essentialist account maintains that authenticity is the result of discovering and realizing one’s ‘true self’. The genealogy shows that essentialist authenticity can serve the function of supporting continuity in one’s individual characteristics. A genealogy of essentialist authenticity is not only methodologically interesting as the first functional genealogy of a contingent concept. It can also deepen the functional understanding of authenticity used in neuroethics, provide a possible explanation for the prevalence of (...) the idea of an essentialist true self and justify the use of the ideal of authenticity. First, essentialist authenticity is defined and explained through the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, a general need to have steady characteristics is derived from basic human practices. Third, circumstances that make it more challenging to steady oneself are identified and shown to have become more prevalent in the age of modernity when the ideal of authenticity emerged. Finally, it is shown how essentialist authenticity helps to steady the self. (shrink)

Introduction: Time and the shared world -- The "subject" of inquiry -- Mineness and the practical first-person -- Being and otherness: Sartre's critique -- Heideggerian aprioricity and the categories of being -- The temporality of care -- Fursorge: acknowledging the other Dasein -- Authenticity, inauthenticity, and the extremes of Fursorge -- Conclusion.

‘‘Post-normal science’’ has received much attention in recent years, but like many iconic concepts, it has attracted differing conceptualizations, applications, and implications, ranging from being a ‘‘cure-all’’ for democratic deficit to the key to achieving more sustainable futures. This editorial article introduces a Special Issue that takes stock of research on PNS and critically explores how such research may develop. Through reviewing the history and evolution of PNS, the authors seek to clarify the extant definitions, conceptualizations, and uses of PNS. (...) The authors identify five broad areas of research on, or using, PNS which have developed over four decades. Their analysis suggests that the 1990s represent a symbolic watershed in the use of PNS terminology, when the concept was further developed and applied to highly complicated issues such as climate change. The authors particularly distinguish between uses of PNS as a normative prescription and as a practical method. Through this classification, they set out gaps and research questions arising. They then briefly summarize the Special Issue articles and consider their relationship to each other and the research questions raised by their analysis. They conclude by considering what the articles in this issue suggest for future theory building in PNS and related scholarship. (shrink)

Les enfants de migrants sont souvent plus à l’aise que leurs parents dans la langue du pays d’accueil et peuvent jouer de ce fait un rôle d’interprète au sein de la famille. Cela peut-il entraîner une inversion des rôles parents/enfants et avec quelles conséquences? L’analyse de treize protocoles d’enfants de 8 à 14 ans (un dessin de famille et un entretien semi-directif accompagné de supports visuels et de figurines, pour aider les enfants à exprimer leurs ressentis et leur perception de (...) la dynamique familiale dans diverses situations) donne de nombreux indices d’une parentification douloureuse : peur de ne pas être à la hauteur, sentiments d’injustice, dévalorisation des parents, conflits fraternels et non-reconnaissance de leurs efforts et de leurs compétences pour traduire. Les indices d’une parentalisation fonctionnelle plus positive, telles que la fierté ou le sentiment de maturité, sont toujours associés à des expériences de remerciements ou de félicitations. Ces résultats invitent à sensibiliser les professionnels et les parents sur l’importance des signes de reconnaissance à l’égard des enfants interprètes qui contribuent à les maintenir à une place d’enfant. (shrink)